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Abstract: 
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and democratic transition. We propose first an econometric analysis of the determinants 
of the democratization process through a "probit" model. We consider a sample of 173 
countries, with 44 that have experienced a democratic transition over the period 1980-2010. 
Our results reveal that variables related to human development and individual freedom 
facilitate the initiation of the democratic process in contrast to those related to social 
heterogeneity. In the second part, we study the impact of the democratic transition on FDI 
inflows. In order to avoid endogeneity, we limit the analysis to countries in transition and 
similar ones deduced from a matching process carried out after the first part. Our results 
confirm that democratic transitions lead to a significant increase in FDI inflows.  
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I. Introduction : 
The Arab Spring has allowed people to break the chains of dictatorship and to breathe the 
fresh air of freedom. Few analysts have predicted that such changes will blow in the Arab 
world and during such a short period. Initial objectives of these revolutions have focused 
exclusively on freedom, on employment, on improving the living conditions and the 
establishment of democracy.  
Revolutions are a great hope but also a huge challenge. Some European and Latino American 
countries experienced this transition to democracy. We can mention as an example the decline 
of military rule in Argentina, the fall of fascism in the south of Europe, the end of the war in 
former Yugoslavia, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the democratization of the communist bloc. 
Right out of dictatorships, countries faced to several problems that arise on the way of 
transition consolidation. Some difficulties and issues arose: what constitution and what 
electoral system to choose?  How to ensure the independence of the media? How to 
redistribute wealth and fight against corruption? How to reorganize the economy and restore it 
after the dictatorship and the revolution? How to maintain a real social progress that ensures 
adherence to democracy?   
The future of the political transition, stability and security will depend largely on the ability of 
the economy to create jobs and growth based on a renewed education system… In this sense, 
countries rely on foreign direct investment as one of the most important stimulus of growth 
and employment. 
Countries in transition are often a source of opportunities for international growth for foreign 
companies. They offer new markets opened to the world and that still very competitive.   
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 FDI occupy a prominently place in any development strategy and is a key instrument to 
ensure a better integration into the international economy increasingly globalized and a 
determining factor in terms of technology acquisition and improvement of competitiveness. 
Countries in transition are rushing so fierce to enhance and diversify their economies in order 
to attract more investors and benefit from the advantages provided by the FDI. In this sense, a 
fundamental question arises: "Why a multinational firm chooses to establish a subsidiary in 
one country and not in another?"  
The choice of location depends on the degree of adequacy of the company's objectives and 
attractiveness factors provided by the host country. In this regard, the host country must have 
number of determinants and prerequisites needed to attract foreign investors. In this sense, the 
result of this research will focus on enumerating the most important features in the process of 
attracting FDI.  
The primary concern of our work is interested in identifying factors that encourage investors 
to locate in a particular country and not in another. To reach this identification, we have to 
correct the endogeneity problem using the matching method.  
To reach this identification, we had first to correct the problem of endogeneity using the 
matching method. This correction was based on the regression of meaningful factors which 
are behind the trigger of the transition process. Our study is built on the work of Lipset (1959) 
and Barro (1999).  We consider a set of economic, social and political variables affecting 
transition through a "probit" model. We consider a sample that includes 173 countries, with 
44 in transition. The results are consistent with those of the basic models. The results obtained 
are consistent with those of the basic models. Economic variables, those related to human 
development and to individual freedoms facilitate the initiation of the democratic process in 
contrast to those related to social heterogeneity.  
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Subsequently, we limit the study to countries in transition and those similar deduced from the 
matching method. Therefore, our sample is composed of 77 countries with 44 in transition. At 
the end, a panel study will be used to identify among the economic, institutional and social 
factors, those that have a significant impact on FDI flows. The identification of factors will be 
based on the OLI paradigm initiated by Dunning (1977). Using a fixed effect model, the most 
significant determinants are those economic (GDP per capita, labor ...). However, the 
transition to democracy and the political and institutional variables do not affect investment 
inflows. 
Our research will be organized as follows: The first part is devoted to the theoretical review of 
fundamental determinants of FDI and the specification of the model which required for 
quantifying the significant factors in attracting foreign capital.  Before moving to the next 
part, we redress the endogeneity problem that can occur in the estimation. For this, we use the 
matching method to determine the sample of countries that will be used to study the origins of 
investment attraction.  The matching is based on the estimation of determinant factors causing 
democratic change. Therefore, we will show a historical overview and a literature review of 
the transition and the main determinants behind the democratization process. To conclude, we 
will present data used, stylized facts and we will show the main results of factors causing 
transitions and thereafter the important features of the economic and political life, which are 
the origin of the entry of FDI. 
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II. FDI and transition:  
a. Theoretical Background   
Direct investment contributes to the economic growth of host countries and the achievement 
of major government‟s objectives (enlargement of the industrial infrastructure, employment, 
reduction of balance of payments constraints, etc). This justifies the attention provided to 
studies of attracting factors of FDI: capital flows are generally attracted by economic 
fundamentals of the host country (market size, economic and political stability, liberalization 
of trade policies, the state of infrastructure and institutions, etc). However, despite the 
growing importance for the international investment in transition economies, there is no 
unified theoretical framework to detect all determinants of FDI.  The absence of a reference 
framework is often due to differences in the evolution of FDI approaches.  
The literature classifies investment attraction factors as advantages specific to firms, to 
targeted sectors and those specific to host countries. A first attempt was made by Dunning 
(1977) who offers a comprehensive approch for explanatory factors of direct investment 
through the OLI paradigm, in which appears a combination of advantage (specific advantages, 
those of location and internalization factors). New theories of international trade enrich the 
analysis. The work of Brainard (1993) came to overcome deficiencies of the traditional 
theory. They put forward a classification of the determinants of FDI by the type of 
investment: horizontal and vertical FDI. Multinationals adopt a horizantal investment strategy 
where benefits which located near consumers are high and when firms can achieve economies 
of scale in the presence of intangible assets, of implementation costs relatively low and of 
strong demand on the host market.  In contrast, we talk about vertical FDI when firms 
integrate the perspective of international division of the production processes. Multinationals 
divided their activities across countries depending on different comparative advantages.  
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More recently, some authors have established studies on institutional determinants of FDI, 
especially in countries in transition and developing countries. Michalet (1997) argues that 
when the legal and regulatory environment is constantly changing arbitrarily, and there is an 
absence of a specialized court that ensures their compliance, companies are forcing to limit or 
to suspend their financial commitments. Other authors have focused instead on corruption and 
bad governance. They argue that the corruption increases administrative costs and therefore 
discourage the entry of FDI. 
Most important advatages for the implementation of FDI are economic considerations. 
Treated determinants are often related to resources or assets available locally: those relating to 
market size and those related to production cost advantages. Factors attached to the available 
resources in the host country concern factors directly related to production, such as: raw 
materials, a skilled labor abundant and cheap, and innovative technology assets.  
According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), direct 
investment flows are explained primarily by the size of the host country. It is an important 
determinant of FDI when multinationals are interested more often to countries with enormous 
demand. Furthermore high rates of growth may indicate a high efficiency and can attract more 
foreign investment. 
 
Secondly, when in a territory, the basic infrastructure is developed, the cost of the investment 
and the exploitation are low, this increases the return on investment and therefore stimulates 
FDI. Where such infrastructure is lacking, the company is obliged to build itself such roads to 
deliver its product and this represents a loss of money and time and therefore a loss of 
competitiveness.  
In addition, the degree of trade openness of the host country is considered as one of FDI 
encouragment. In general, the impact of trade openness is related to the type of foreign 
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investment. Higher trade barriers can attract horizontal FDI because they protect foreign 
investors in the local market against imports of competitors. Conversely, the multinational 
engaged in export-oriented investment, called vertical FDI, prefer to invest in a relatively 
open economy, because trade barriers increase transaction costs.  
Finally, low cost labor is a key factor in attracting FDI especially in sectors with intensively 
labor use.  Companies prefer locations with lower wage and high productivity labors. They 
are looking for locations with a balance between wages and profitability, and where social 
legislation and trade unions are weak or nonexistent. Similarly, multinationals are seeking for 
more labor qualities since these companies are more interested in a production intensive in 
capital and technology.  
It is nevertheless important to note that the determinants of foreign direct investment flows 
are not only economic; it also involves factors related to the governance in the host countries, 
namely the control of corruption and the improving of the policy and regulatory frames.  
Several recent studies examine the relationship between democratic rights and FDI. Busse 
(2004) argues that multinationals are more likely to be attracted by countries where 
democracy is respected. Other researchers have shown that the establishment of democratic 
system affects positively the FDI inflows: it provides restrictions on elected officials and 
thereby reducing the arbitrary action of government. Consequently, the risk of overturns and 
social disorders are reduced and therefore strengthens the protection of property rights. Li and 
Resnick (2003) emphasize the causal links between FDI and democracy and argue that 
democratic rights stimulate and improve the protection of property rights which subsequently 
stimulate FDI inflows.  
 
However, other studies show that the existence of democracy can negatively affects 
investment inflow: Investors are seeking for more political stability that is provided by 
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dictatorships. It allows a continuity of activities in the same legal and political environment in 
contrast of democratic regime characterized by a continuous change. On the other hand, 
multinationals prefer to invest in autocratic countries where autocratarian governments are in 
a position to offer generous incentives: protection against unions, tax incentives. They also 
offer the ability to retain and exploit monopoly positions in profitable sectors (natural 
resources). 
Finally, several studies focus on country risks. Instability and disorders affect the behavior of 
multinational firms to relocate overseas and improve their profitabilities.  Government 
stability, absence of internal conflict and ethnic tensions, warranty of democratic rights and 
respect of law and order are essential determinants of FDI flows.  These factors reflect the 
effect of good governance on foreign investors.  They feel reassured to invest in stable 
economic environments.  
However, social and political instabilities predominate in the transition period. This manifests 
in the confiscation or the appropriation of property, the change in macroeconomic 
management and especially the changes in the regulatory environment.  However, when the 
long-term prospects are very attractive, investors adopt an attitude of "wait and see". They 
reduce their presence to a minimum to maintain their presence and observe more closely the 
evolution of the country situation. 
b. Model Specification 
The empirical literature had found mixed conclusions on fundamental determinants of FDI.  
Despite the theoretical frameworks, few potential factors provide robust empirical results. 
Chakrabati (2001) finds that the market size of host countries and the trade openness are 
robust. Other variables, according to this author, such as the cost of labor and the exchange 
rate are not significant.  
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One of problems often encountered in the empirical literature is related to endogeneity.  For 
example, the market size of a country is usually measured by GDP per capita, and therefore 
the correlation between FDI and market size could result from an endogenous determination 
of this latter. This econometric problem can also be linked to omit variables that affect the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables. 
To validate the most important factors in attracting FDI, we estimate the following model. 
This specification is derived from theAsiedu specification.
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LnFDIit = ∝0 +∝1 Transitioni +∝4 GDPpcit +∝5 Inflationit +∝6 PopulationTotit
+∝7 Infrastructureit +∝8 Exportit +∝9 Educationit
+ α10Institutionit + Uit . 
 
Variable Définition Source 
LnFDIit 
The dependent variable in the model shows the log of total 
FDI net inflows. The data are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
GDPpc it The logarithm of real GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Inflationit 
Inflation measured by the average annual change in the 
index of consumer prices. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Populationit 
The logarithm of the total population.It is an estimation of 
the number of residents in mid-year. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Infrastuctureit The logarithm of the number of telephone lines per capita. 
The Quality of 
Government Dataset 
Codebook(2011) 
Exportit The ratio of exports on gross domestic product. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
                                                          
4Asiedu, Elizabeth and Donald Lien (2010) Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural 
resources. Journal of International Economics (Elsevier). 
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Educationit The expenditure on education in GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Transition 
1 if the country is in transition. 
0 if the country is not in transition. 
 
Institutionit 
A measure of the degree of democracy in the institutions. 
The indicator of democracy is a scale of (0-1), 1 represents 
a country with fully democratic institutions. 
The QoG Social Policy 
Dataset(2010) 
 
 
However, this model can include endogeneity problems. The endogeneity of regressors, due 
to a correlation with the error term, can involve significant biases in the estimation of 
behaviors. When both the explained variable and the regressors are continuous, several 
methods to detect the endogeneity and correct its effects are available. Yet, when among the 
variables, there are dichotomous variables; the resolution of endogeneity problems is more 
difficult. 
In the following, we focus on solving the problem of endogeneity through the matching 
method. The work will proceed to a reduction in the sample size to be limited to countries in 
transition and those that have the same characteristics. This transformation provides an 
optimally capture of the effect of democratization on FDI. 
c. Endogeneity issues: 
In order to identify the impact of the transition and changes that accompany it on the 
attraction of foreign financial assistance, we have taken into account countries in transition 
and those with similar characteristics but which have not experienced a democratic change. 
Using the matching method, we define the control sample and similar countries that have not 
experienced democratic transition.  
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This statistical approach known as "Matching" provides techniques to solve the endogeneity 
problem by restricting the analysis of an economic phenomenon in a group of participants and 
non-participants correspondents, where they are selected by the basis on similarity in the 
observed characteristics. 
i. Principle of the method: 
The matching method is a method of evaluating widely used to estimate an average effect of 
treatment (For our research, the treatment is the fact of going througha transition). This 
method has become popular in several areas including statistics (Rubin 2006, Rosenbaum 
2002), medicine (Rubin 1997), economics (Abadie and Imbens 2006; Dehejia and Wahba 
1999; 2002), political science (Imai 2005; Sekhon 2004), Sociology (Morgan and Harding 
2006). 
The "matching" method attempts to match each individual treated with one or more untreated 
whose observable characteristics are the closest as possible to those of the treated individual. 
The approach provides techniques to simplify the problem of the choice of control groups 
since it is difficult to have non-participants with exactly the same values for all observed 
characteristics for any attendee. This method assumes that the only differences between the 
two populations (Country) treaties (having experienced a transition) and untreated comes 
from individual characteristics and treatment. If we control differences in characteristics, then 
there remains only the effect of treatment. Access to the program is represented by a random 
variable "T" for each individual "i";  
 Ti = 1 if the individual access to the program (the country has knowed a 
transition)  
 Ti = 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, the results of the program will be measured through two variables: 
 Y1i if the individual receives the treatment (T = 1) 
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 Y0i if the individual is not treated (T = 0) 
 
ii. Estimation: 
The "propensity score" is the probability that a treatment (transition) is administered to an 
individual (country). Then, treated individuals are matched to individuals who are closest in 
terms of their value of estimated propensity score. When estimating, we are forced to make 
choices regarding the estimation model used and variables included in this model. In 
principle, a logistic or probit regression model estimates the probability of treatment.These 
models must include all the observed variables that influence the selection treatment and 
outcome. We use the logistic regression model to estimate the propensity score of a binary 
variable T. 
 T = 1 if the country has undergone a transition 
 T = 0 otherwise. 
Before proceeding with the matching, we need to define variables used and this through a 
review of theoretical and empirical aspects of main determinants behind the democratic 
change. 
 
III. The determinants of democratic transition:  
a. Review of literature 
 
The disappearance of authoritarian regime and the establishment of democracy present both a 
challenge and an opportunity.  
Several questions arised: How do these similar results emerged from different backgrounds 
and regions, what are commonalities that could propel autocratic regimes in the four corners 
of the world to free elections whose outcome remains mysterious.  
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Clearly, many conditions have been met in some parts of the world, rather than elsewhere and 
which were originally triggered the transitional process. However, "What are these 
conditions?‟ 
The recent wave of revolution revived old academic debates on the causes of transitions. 
These searches have not so far given any general theoretical condition of democratization 
despite the recent multiplication of cases.  
Further, our work will be a list of the origins of transition in the literature. Remark to make is, 
above all, that there is no magic or perfect to start the transitional process. 
i. Economic factors : 
A whole area of the literature is focused on the impact of economic variables on the 
democratization process. The hypothesis is based on the work of Lipset (1959), which 
addresses a broad category of measures considered as determinants of democracy, including 
indices of wealth, urbanization and development. The key element of this hypothesis is that 
richer countries are more likely to promote democratic values and to adapt institutional 
norms.  The idea synthesized that the improvement of living conditions is expected to increase 
the economic growth that will lead to the democratization of political regimes. 
The French President François Mitterrand expressed the link between democracy and 
development, during the Conference of Heads of State of Africa and France (1990) in which 
he asserts that the road to democracy is freedom and at the same time development. He cites 
that "By taking the road of development, nations are enagaged on the road to democracy." 
Secondly, there is a close relationship between democratization and human capital 
development.  
Foremost, the issue of education is particularly important. Be citizens, can be not only can be 
learned, but it must also be a shared desire to ensure the establishment of a common destiny. 
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 Educated populations will become more conscious of the importance of the liberation from 
the chains of dictatorship.  Through opinion surveys, Lipset arrives to a conclusion that "the 
most important factor that differentiates those who give answers pro-democracy to other is 
education." It transmits to people broader ideas, helping them to understand the need of 
tolerance, to make more difficult the adaptation of extremist ideas and to help at election time 
the exercise of rational choices. 
Then, health is a main key in the process of transition through the growth and the 
development.  The identification of the relationship between the transition and health are 
limited due to the complexity of the links between the latter and politics. Health is often 
associated to the quality of life characterized by the improvement of population health and 
poverty reducing. For this reason, three of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
endorsed in 2000 at the end of the Millennium Declaration of the UN, are dedicated to 
improving health. 
Otherwise, Lipset (1959) notes that "the democratic state is a result of urban life and it was so 
natural that it appeared for the first time in Greece." He also asserts that democratic countries 
are more urbanized than authoritarian states.  
Urbanization is a process characterized by the mutation of societies from an essentially 
agricultural population organized according to rural social structures, to a society 
predominantly urban, industrial and market-oriented.  Factors that improve the quality of life 
are more common in cities than in rural areas: improved access to health services, 
infrastructure and information. Public policies apply more easily in urban areas.  
ii. Social structure: 
The degree of population heterogeneity, due to differences of ethnicity, language and culture 
can also influence the level of democracy. The usual assumption argues that more 
heterogeneity makes more difficult the maintaining of democracy.  
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The type of heterogeneity of a population (Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic) can influence 
political institutions and therefore the regime.  
In multi-ethnic societies, political systems are highly sensitive to social fragmentation; Clans 
are not likely to abandon their authority or to share power with rival groups. This 
fragmentation maintains a state of extreme tension and a constant risk of civil war. Early 
studies claim that when heterogeneity is high, it is more difficult to sustain democracy. 
On the other hand, the frequent transformation of the religious landscape is taken the form of 
fragmentation in fields and in places of worship, and it is reflecting more profoundly new 
ways to think, to communicate and to practice. This development is seen in a global context 
marked by crisis of legitimacy affecting traditional social and political organisation (parties, 
unions, churches). Democratization can be blocked by religions and dogmas that have a 
strong hierarchical structure.  Huntington (1993) shows that the traditionally strong links 
between religious leaders and the state were still present in the country with confissions 
Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim. These religions also tend to be hierarchical and resistant to 
change. 
Lastly, if a democratization process aims to keep its promises to improve well-being, it must 
be able to count on the contribution of all its citizens. This cannot happen if women and girls 
are not able, in law or customary law, to participate fully in the political and economic life of 
the country. During the opening ceremony of the Conference of the „International Association 
of  Women Police‟ Asha-Rose Migiro, Deputy Secretary-General of the UN, states that 
„When women are truly committed and empowered, all of society benefits.‟  Kofi Annan, 
former Secretary General of the United Nations, said, "Several studies show that there is no 
tool for development more effective than the empowerment of women.  
It is irrefutable that the increase in the number of women elected to political office leads to 
increased political focus on the quality of life and reflecting the priorities of families and 
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minorities. Women's participation in political life is accompanied by profound positive impact 
on communities, legislatures, political parties and people's lives and contributes to increased 
efficiency of democracies. 
iii. Civil liberties 
In public opinion, the respect of human rights is often presented as an aspect of fight for 
democracy. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the UN said in March 1990 "A full 
democratization of Europe will be a reaffirmation of the universal character of the Declaration 
of Human Rights."  In this perspective, democracy and human rights are supposed growing at 
the same pace. They even become almost synonymous. According to the UNDP in its 2000 
report, democracy is the only form of political regime that respects the existing five categories 
of rights: economic, social, political, civil and cultural rights. 
Various types of policy interventions are needed to give substance to these rights in a 
democratic regime. The Freedom House index of civil liberties is the broadest concept, which 
concerns freedom of speech, of press, of religion and a variety of legal protections index. 
Civil Liberties variables are positively correlated with democratization. This result suggests 
that the economic and social forces that promote democracy are similar to those that promote 
civil liberties. 
To identify causal relationships between the various factors mentioned in the literature and 
democratic transition, we have used a qualitative model ie model "probit". The use of this 
discrete choice model is due to the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable. We 
consider a sample that includes 173 countries, with 44 in transition. 
To identify the origins of the transitions, we estimate the following model: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 =∝0 RealGDPpc𝑖𝑡 +  ∝1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  ∝2 𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 + α3Healthindexit  
+∝4 𝑇𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 +∝5 ReligFractionaliz𝑖𝑡 +∝6 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡
+∝7 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +∝8 𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡  
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Where i indicates the country and t referred to the year.These indices are used for all variable. 
 
Variable  Source 
Transitionit 
(dichotomous variable) 
Transitionit = 
0 if countryi has not know a transition in the period between 
1981-2010 
1 if countryi is in transition from 1981 to 2010. 
Modeling Transitions to 
and from Democracy 
Jay Ulfelder et Mike 
Lustik (2005) 
RealGDPpcit The logarithm of GDP per capita 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Educationit 
The percentage of female students enrolled at primary level 
relative to the total number of students (enrollment in public 
and private schools). 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Healthindexit 
It represents the prevalence of HIV for males aged between 
15 and 24 years. 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Ruralpopit 
Measure the rural population. The index is calculated as the 
difference between total population and urban population 
World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development Finance 
(world bank(2011)) 
Tortureit 
Torture is rated on a scale of three classes: 
(0) practiced frequently. 
(1) Performed occasionally. 
(2) Not performed. 
 
The Quality of 
Government Dataset 
Codebook(2011) 
ReligFractionalizit 
 
It reflects the probability that two people chosen at random 
from a given country do not belong to the same religious 
group. 
 
The Quality of 
Government Dataset 
Codebook(2011) 
Freedomspeechit 
Variable calculated from four components: Laws and 
Regulations, pressures and political controls, economic 
influences and repressive actions. The scale ranges from 0 
(Less free) to 10 (very free). 
 
The Quality of 
Government Dataset 
Codebook(2011) 
Presslibertiesit 
It represents censorship, intervention and part of the 
government in the media (including radio, TV, Internet, and 
national news agencies) is as follows: 
(0) Complete 
(1) a few times 
(2) Never 
The Quality of 
Government Dataset 
Codebook(2011) 
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WomenParticipationit 
 
Measure the position of women in political and economic life: 
 
(0) None of the political and economic rights of women are 
guaranteed by law. 
 
(1) The political and economic equality are guaranteed by 
law. However, there are significant limitations in practice. 
 
(2) The political and economic equality are guaranteed by law 
and practice more or less visible. 
 
(3) The political and economic equality is guaranteed by law 
and in practice. 
The Quality of 
Government Dataset 
Codebook(2011) 
 
IV.  Data and main results 
After discussing the main theories of democratic transition, and having identified of the various 
determinants of the transitional processes, the work will attempt to validate possible correlations 
between the probability of the transition birth and the factors already mentioned. The work uses a 
"probit" model estimated on a database collected during the period 1981-2010 on a sample of 173 
countries.  
a. Transition determinants: 
i. Dependent variable: 
Transitionit is our dependent variable. It is a dichotomous variable: 
Trasitionit = 
 0 if country i has know a transition in the period between 1981-2010 
 1 if country i is in transition from 1981 to 2010. 
The country is considered as a country in transition when it had known a policy change allowing the 
passage from an authoritarian state to a democracy. 
According to T. L. Karl and P. Schmitter (1991), the change can be made by: 
 Pactes: elites shall agree between them to move away from authoritarianism. 
 Imposition: elites use their forces to establish an opposition. 
 Reforms: mass is mobilized in a compromise with the absence of violence.  
 Revolution: mass gets up with weapons to bring down the government. 
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According to the study period (1981-2010), selected transition countries belong to the third wave of 
transition. The rest of countries in the sample have non-democratic regimes (monarchy, military rule, 
civil war ...).  
Using a variable indicating the type of governing regime (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007), we remove all 
the countries being democratic before our study period (1981-2010) to make the sample more 
homogeneous. 
ii. Explanatory Variables : 
 RealGDPpcit: The logarithm of real GDP per capita. This variable is a measure of wealth and 
economic performance of a country. According to the hypothesis of Lipset (1959), a high level of 
GDP per capita increases the probability of the establishment of democratie. Therefore, we expect 
a positive significance. 
To measure the human development, we refer to three indices: 
o Educationit: represents the performance of the education sector. Lipset (1959) argues that 
a better cultivated population is more likely to trigger the democratic process. The 
relationship between the variable and democratization is assumed to be positive. 
o Healthindexit: is a measure of health development. The increase of the number of infected 
people reflects the deterioration of the health‟s level. Empirical studies show a significant 
negative relationship between this indicator and the level of democracy. 
o Ruralpopit: refers to people living in rural areas. It is calculated as the difference between 
total population and urban population. Lipset argues that democratic countries are more 
urbanized than dictatorial or authoritarian states. Therefore, the sign may be negative 
between our measurement and transition. 
 
 Presslibertiesit: is an index of press freedom.  Several researches say that media have immense 
power to influence the public opinion and thus circulate the principles of democracy among 
populations. We therefore expect a positive correlation. 
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 ReligFractionalizit: expresses the religious fractionation. When the percentage is high, the society is 
more segmented (Alesina et al. (2003)). The empirical studies show that countries in transition are a 
little less fragmented than countries that have remained autocratic. The fractionation has a negative 
impact on the index of democracy. 
 Freedomspeechit: measures the freedom of expression. It has often been one of the first steps 
towards democracy. In the majority of empirical results, this variable is positively related to 
democratic change. 
 WomenParticipationit: represente equality rights of women in economic and political life. The idea 
shared in empirical works is that the success of the democratization process depends on the 
contribution of all citizens namely the full participation of women in the political and economic life. 
 Tortureit: represents the use of torture against opponents. International conventions and treaties 
emphasize that the abolition of torture presents a leap forward to the democratic process. The 
expected relationship for the indicator is positive. 
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iii. Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Transition Transition Transition 
    
Pressliberties  0.0410*** 0.0401*** 
  (0.00898) (0.00926) 
ReligFractionaliz  -0.935*** -0.644*** 
  (0.0966) (0.102) 
Freedomspeech  0.190*** 0.105*** 
  (0.0341) (0.0353) 
Womenparticipation  0.317*** 0.220*** 
  (0.0470) (0.0477) 
Torture  -0.246*** -0.264*** 
  (0.0339) (0.0352) 
RealGDPpc 0.125***  0.0811*** 
 (0.00973)  (0.0127) 
Healthindex -0.295***  -0.295*** 
 (0.0321)  (0.0366) 
Education 0.0523***  0.0717*** 
 (0.00925)  (0.0117) 
Ruralpop -1.63e-09***  -1.70e-09*** 
 (3.27e-10)  (3.68e-10) 
Constant -5.978*** -0.860*** -5.935*** 
 (0.484) (0.0818) (0.609) 
    
Observations 5,108 3,803 3,769 
 
 
 
The above table shows results of the probit estimation of the three following regression:  
 The first is devoted only to relations between transition and economic factors: 
o  The results show that all variables in the model are significant. The coefficient of 
gross domestic product per capita is positive and significant, which means that direct 
democracy is an ordinary good that is more consumed in the richest societies. The 
most prosperous countries are more likely to experience a transition. 
o Indices of human development are also significant: HIV prevalence and rural 
population affect negatively the realization of transition. The access to education is 
always positive and provides evidence of the link between education and democracy 
highlighted by Glaeser et al. (2006). The results lead us to assert that educated and 
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healthy population living in rural environment is ready to accept democratic principles 
and eradicate dictatorship. 
 
On the other hand, the second regression focuses on the relationship between social and civil 
derminants on democratization: 
 The coefficient of "torture" is significant. Although we expected a positive sign consistent 
with the literature, we found a negative relationship between the use of torture and transition. 
However, the negative sign may be warranted. Authoritarian regimes, by their police devices, 
have often used major forces and acts of torture to face claims and change's incentive or a 
possible overthrow of the regime. Autocratic forces are the standard way to crush the 
opposition and to seize the throne.  
 The coefficient of the religious fragmentation is negative and significant, as it is predicted by 
theory. The result is cohesive with the idea of Aghion et al (2004) which states that in more 
fragmented societies, a group may impose control over other groups and impose restrictions 
on their political freedom. 
 Freedoms of speech and press are significantly positive. This confirms that these rights allow 
informing, inspiring and encouraging people to change and at the same time to assess and 
support the level of democracy. 
 The same results are also reflected in the participation of women confirming the hypothesis 
that the transition and consolidation of democracy requires the participation of all the people 
namely the total contribution of women in political and economic life of the country. 
Finally, the third regression brings together the two previous estimates. We found the same results 
previously obtained. From these regressions, variables that are used, are then integrated into the 
matching method to correct the endogeneity problem. 
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b. Matching: Data and results 
The stata command that had used is psmatch2, it calculates an approximation of standard errors for the 
treatment effects assuming that the observations are independent, the weight is fixed. We assume also 
that there are a homoskedasticity of the outcome variable and its variance in the outcome does not 
depend on the propensity score. 
The sample on which we work includes 173 countries, including 44 countries in transition period 
(1981-2010). 
The treatment variable is the transition variable defined as follows: 
 If the country is in transition, transition = 1 and therefore T = 1, 
 If the country is not in transition, transition = 0 and thus T = 0. 
 
For each year of transition, the countrie involved in the democratic change is used to determine its 
untreated corresponding. 
The variable used as propensity score is EDUCATIONit.This variable indicates the percentage of 
female students enrolled at primary level by the total number of students ie enrollment in public and 
private schools. 
 
The control variables are those used previously: 
 RealGDPpcit: The logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. 
 Healthindexit: HIV prevalence for males aged between 15 and 24 years. 
 Ruralpopit: refers to people living in rural areas. 
 Presslibertiesit: The index of press freedom. 
 ReligFractionalizit: expresses the religious split. 
Through matching, we obtain at the end a sample of 77 countries, including 44 countries in transition. 
After constructing the sample which consists of countries in transition and those that are similar, the 
following part will focus on identifying impacts of democratic change on the attraction of foreign 
investments seen as a key of economic recovery. 
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c. FDI and Transitions 
The determination of the relationship between FDI and specific characteristics of transition has often 
been the subject of several research projects such as Dunning (1988) and Mucchielli (1991).  
These authors show that relocation‟s decisions of multinational firms are based on the presence of 
specific characteristics for minimizing costs and improving productivity and profitability in the host 
country. These factors are economic, social and institutional. 
The objective of this chapter is to validate the determinants of FDI, especially those related to 
transition countries. Our sample is composed of 77 countries, including 44 in the transition period 
from 1981 to 2010. 
i. Dependent variable : 
The variable that we want to explain in this part is the log of FDI inflows. This variable presents net 
inflows of investment needed to acquire an interest or to control the management of a company 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is is represented by the sum of the capital, 
reinvested earnings and other capital of short and long term. 
Through the regression, we try to measure the sensitivity of capital flows facing the democratic 
transition. Several reasons led us to choose this index: 
• The majority of previous studies are using this variable to explain the determinants of FDI. 
• The availability of data. 
• This variable effectively captures the movements of foreign investment in the world. 
 
iii. Explanatory variables : 
• Transition: Over the entire period, this variable takes into account the effect of differences between 
the countries likely to know a transition and those, which are similar. 
• GDPpcit: It is a measure of growth reached by a particular country. A high growth rate defines a high 
efficiency and hence motivates the arrival of foreign investment. However, we must keep in mind that 
the high growth rates can be stimulated by FDI (Mcmillan (1995)). 
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• Inflationit:  A theoretical conception of Aseidu (2002) shows a negative relationship between FDI 
and increased inflation. Irregular increase prices and increase production costs have a negative impact 
on FDI (Brewer 1993 and Urata and Kawai 2000). 
• Infrastructureit: It approximates the infrastructure development. It measures the number of 
telephone lines per capita. Studies have shown that this variable is positively correlated with FDI 
(Asiedu, 2003). Foreign investors prefer economies with well-developed network of roads and 
airports, water supply, availability of uninterrupted power and telephone lines and internet access. A 
weak infrastructure increases the cost of implementation of activities and reduces the rate of return. 
We expect that countries with good infrastructure attract more FDI (Morisset, 2000; Alfaro et al. 
2005). 
• Populationit: it estimated the market size and quantified the total population. Empirical studies 
affirm the existence of a positive and significant relationship between market size and FDI inflows. 
Indeed, when the economy is larger, the foreign investor is hoping to find easier an outlet for its 
products, which is necessary to achieve high profits (Agarual (1980)). 
• Exportit: It measures the degree of trade openness and refers to the free movement of goods and 
services (imports and exports). Studies have found a positive correlation between openness and FDI 
(Chakrabarti, 2001; Morisset, 2000). 
• Educexpendit: measuring public spending for education. This variable may indicate an improvement 
in the education level among the population and reflects skills and qualities of workmanship. This 
variable was identified as a strongly determining factor of FDI inflows, especially in fields of 
computers and new information technologies. 
• Institutionit: The variable is based on three key interrelated:  
o The absence of corruption which takes into account bribes, jobs reserved and „favors for 
favors‟,  
o The rule of law and order namely the strength and the impartiality of the judiciary power 
and the respect of public law,  
o The quality of the bureaucracy and the enforcement of contract.  
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Acemulgo (2001) argues that institutional improvement, especially in terms of the transparency of 
transactions and the fight against corruption, reassures investors and thus increases the entry of FDI. 
The expected sign is positive. 
To identify the effect of the transition on the FDI, we add the following variable:  
• transition_effect: Our variable is derived from the first part. It differentiates between the situation 
before and after transition and therefore distinguishes the specific effect of democratic change on FDI 
inflows. The sign is ambiguous. First, the transition is accompanied by a strong instability, a 
breakdown of infrastructure, the deterioration in terms of trade and the balance of payments and a 
complete halt of economic activity. However, the transition allows the establishment of a democratic 
regime where rules the respect for law, the fight against corruption and the availability of information.  
The transition is also followed by major reforms, tax and regulatory policy planning and 
macroeconomic projects. These changes are prompting investors to locate in countries in transition. 
transition_effectit 
Is dummy variable: 
• transition_effect= 0 if the country did not know or did not 
transition. 
• transition_effect= 1 for country in transition from the year of 
initiation of the process. 
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iv. Results: 
 (1) 
VARIABLES lnFDI 
  
Traitement_Matching 0.669*** 
 (0.188) 
Transition -0.486** 
 (0.192) 
Transition_ effect 0.610*** 
 (0.234) 
GDPpc 0.545*** 
 (0.0592) 
Population 1.016*** 
 (0.0448) 
Export 0.0319*** 
 (0.00307) 
Educationexpend 0.0123** 
 (0.00498) 
Inflation -0.000413*** 
 (0.000127) 
Institution 0.425 
 (0.368) 
Infrastructure 0.0260*** 
 (0.00765) 
Constant -3.549*** 
 (0.875) 
  
Observations 734 
R-squared 0.658 
 
The coefficient associated to the variable related to the gross domestic product per capita "GDPpc" is 
significantly positive. The sign obtained confirms that an increase in GDP per capita reflects a rapid 
growth of the national economy and provides an environment conducive to investment. This result is 
relevant in several studies (Gliberman and Shapiro (2002) and Asiedu (2008)). The negative sign of 
the coefficient associated to inflation is expected. High inflation is likely to increase the risk premium 
to the foreign investors and transaction costs. This can therefore hinder FDI entries. This is consistent 
with work Aseidu (2008). 
Similarly, the "Population" is positively related to FDI inflows, asserting that the foreign investor has 
the hope to find a market for its products in large economies, necessary to achieve high profits 
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(Agarual (1980)). The coefficient of the variable „Educexpend‟ is positive and significant, confirming 
that the qualified workforce is a key determinant of foreign investment. Indeed, investors are 
increasingly looking for more qualified workforces for companies which focus to the production of 
intensive technology goods.  
The degree of trade openness measured by „Export‟ is positively related to FDI inflows. Our results 
are consistent with those of Morisset (2000) and Chakrabarti (2001). Investors are attracted by 
economies with a strong trade and characterized by low trade restrictions.  
For countries in transition, despite the instability and the economic decline during the democratic 
change, traditional factors of FDI attraction are still valid. The coefficient associated to "Transition" is 
significantly negative. This explains that transition‟s countries receive less FDI compared to similar 
countries.This can be explained by the presence of a social tensions and instability.  
However, the fact that the variable "transition_effect" is positively related to FDI argues that 
democratic transitions lead to an improvement of the economic, political and institutional 
situations.This consolidation creates a favorable climate for investors and thus leads to increased FDI 
inflows. 
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V. Conclusion: 
The purpose of this research is to identify determinants of foreign investment in transition period. We 
were interested to FDI as the most useful and the most persistent factor for economic recoveries. 
Governments of countries in transition as well as international institutions are concerned by the recent 
wave of democratic transition and their common interest is to ensure the success of the democratic 
process. It is interesting to understand this phenomenon, its origins and the expected benefits.  
As we mentioned above, the transition of great hope but also a huge challenge. The success of the 
transition thus requires the mobilization of a number of resources which are necessary in the pursuit of 
political and economic reconstruction projects. Among the means, we focused on foreign investment 
and their determinants. 
The "World Investment Report" 2012 made by the UNCTAD shows that despite the economic crisis, 
the largest increases in FDI are registered by the former transition countries namely South America 
which makes an excellent year (+ 34%) driven by Brazil, Colombia and Chile.  
South Asia posted also a growth well above the world average, to 26% for $ 117 billion of FDI, with 
the super performance of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. These results are of great hope for the 
countries currently in transition. 
Not surprisingly, the Arab Spring has dealt a heavy blow to foreign direct investment. Between 2010 
and 2011, FDI flows to North Africa have indeed decreased from 13.6 billion to 5.8 billion, with a 
sharp drop of -57%. The main cause of the overall decline is the instability in Egypt and Libya. 
Tunisia has recorded a decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) of 29% in 2011, according to data 
collected from the Tunisian Agency for Promotion and Foreign Investment (FIPA). According to the 
same source, foreign investment in 2011 reached approximately 857 million euros against 1.2 billion 
euros in 2010. 
However, signs of a rebound in economic activity appeared in early 2012: the first quarter, GDP and 
direct investment foreign (FDI) are increasing. 
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It is noteworthy that short-term risks are high and negatively oriented, with a deeper recession than 
expected in Europe, an increase in social tensions, capacity constraints and delays in funding that 
could to curb the fiscal stimulus. However, the hope and the potential recovery remain favorable but it 
is necessary to adopt a program of structural reforms to promote private investment. A baseline 
scenario which assumes the continuation of macroeconomic stability, the improving of the governance 
and the business climate, labor market reforms and the education system and strengthening the 
financial sector. 
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VII. Annexes 
Annexe I: Countries in transition 
Country_code Country_name Year_transition Type_ transition 
PER Peru 1981 5 
BOL Bolivia 1982 4 
SLV El Salvador 1982 2 
HND Honduras 1982 
 
ARG Argentina 1983 5 
TUR Turkey 1983 2 
GRD Grenada 1984 
 
GTM Guatemala 1984 3 
BRA Brazil 1985 
 
URY Uruguay 1985 1 
PHL Philippines 1987 
 
BGR Bulgaria 1989 2 
DEU Germany 1989 5 
PRY Paraguay 1989 2 
ALB Albania 1990 
 
CHL Chile 1990 
 
COM Comoros 1990 1 
CZE Czech Republic 1990 3 
FJI Fiji 1990 
 
HUN Hungary 1990 5 
NIC Nicaragua 1990 4 
POL Poland 1990 3 
ROU Romania 1990 
 
BGD Bangladesh 1991 
 
BEN Benin 1991 
 
RUS Russian Federation 1991 
 
COG Congo, Rep. 1992 5 
MLI Mali 1992 
 
SVN Slovenia 1992 
 
THA Thailand 1992 
 
BDI Burundi 1993 
 
MDG Madagascar 1993 
 
MNG Mongolia 1993 
 
PAN Panama 1994 
 
ZAF South Africa 1994 
 
UKR Ukraine 1994 
 
TZA Tanzania 1995 
 
GHA Ghana 1996 
 
MEX Mexico 1997 4 
ARM Armenia 1998 
 
DJI Djibouti 1999 
 
IDN Indonesia 1999 
 
HRV Croatia 2000 
 
SEN Senegal 2000 
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Annexe II : Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transition 5152 .2562112 .4365822 0 1 
RealGDPpc 
5152 23.83187 2.150379 18.46663 29.61958 
Healthindex 5108 .6087314 1.097865 .1 6.5 
Education 5151 47.54533 2.781885 0 62.02687 
Ruralpop 5152 1.70e+07 8.11e+07 0 8.27e+08 
Pressliberties 5152 4.462539 2.836336 0 9 
ReligFractionaliz 5040 .4395505 .2334893 .0022857 .8602599 
Freedomspeech 
3834 .9551382 .7260003 0 2 
Womenparticipation 5152 1.502523 .5198388 0 3 
Torture 5152 .7084627 .7104772 0 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexe III: Matching estimations: 
 
probit Transition RealGDPpc Healthindex  Education Ruralpop Pressliberties ReligiousFractionaliz   
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -2884.7701   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -2654.8549   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -2649.1864   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -2649.1508   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -2649.1508   
36 
 
 
 
Probit regression                   Number of obs    =       4996 
                                                  LR chi2(5)       =     471.24 
                                                  Prob > chi2      =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2649.1508                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0817 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Transition   |      Coef.    Std. Err.       z     P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   RealGDPpc   |    .110798    .0104206     10.63   0.000     .0903739          .131222 
 Healthindex   |  -.2358257    .0306498     -7.69    0.000    -.2958982     - .1757531 
   Education   |   .0257166    .0062286      4.13    0.000     .0135088         .0379244 
    Ruralpop   |  -1.42e-09    3.31e-10     -4.29    0.000    -2.07e-09    -7.71e-10 
Pressliber~s  |   .0376047    .0073384      5.12    0.000     .0232216         .0519877 
Religiousfractionaliz  |  -.8500959    .0900542     -9.44    0.000    -1.026599      - .6735929 
       _cons   |  -3.109974    .2543795    -12.23   0.000    -3.608549      -2 .6114 
 
 
 psmatch2 Transition , n(1) pscore(Education)out(RealGDPpc Healthindex   Ruralpop 
Pressliberties ReligiousFractionaliz ) cal(1) logit 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable     Sample   |    Treated      Controls        Difference           S.E.              T-stat 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
       RealGDPpc  Unmatched  | 24.5194906   23.5882117   .931278958   .068212075    13.65 
                        ATT   | 24.5194906   23.7921122   .727378368   .251524636     2.89 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
     Healthindex  Unmatched  | .342575758   .710337323  -.367761566   .035173348   -10.46 
                        ATT   | .342575758    .24030303   .102272727   .033009568     3.10 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
        Ruralpop  Unmatched  | 13825093.1   18317945.8  -4492852.73    2641169.1    -1.70 
                        ATT   | 13825093.1   9802456.48   4022636.59   6710353.75     0.60 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
  Pressliberties  Unmatched  | 4.87348485   4.31120783   .562277014   .090477268     6.21 
                        ATT   | 4.87348485   4.45606061   .417424242   .268375529     1.56 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Religiousfractionaliz Unmatche | .379188228    .46187932  -.082691092   .007415625   -11.15 
                        ATT   | .379188228   .446136131  -.066947903   .025932054    -2.58 
----------------------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: S.E. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated. 
 
             | psmatch2: 
 psmatch2:  |   Common 
 Treatment  |  support 
assignment  | On suppor  |     Total 
-----------+-----------+---------- 
 Untreated  |     3,676  |     3,676  
   Treated  |     1,320  |     1,320  
-----------+-----------+---------- 
     Total  |     4,996  |     4,996 
37 
 
 
Annexe V : Sample Deducted After matching: 
 
 
Nom_pays 
Année 
d‟appariement 
traitement 
1 Sri Lanka 1981 0 
2 Peru 1981 1 
3 Venezuela, RB 1982 0 
4 Kazakhstan 1982 0 
5 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1982 0 
6 Honduras 1982 1 
7 Bolivia 1982 1 
8 El Salvador 1982 1 
9 Guyana 1983 0 
10 Venezuela, RB 1983 0 
11 Turkey 1983 1 
12 Argentina 1983 1 
13 Angola 1984 0 
14 Timor-Leste 1984 0 
15 Guatemala 1984 1 
16 Grenada 1984 1 
17 Sri Lanka 1985 0 
18 Ecuador 1985 0 
19 Brazil 1985 1 
20 Uruguay 1985 1 
21 Lithuania 1987 0 
22 Philippines 1987 1 
23 Greece 1989 0 
24 Uganda 1989 0 
25 Colombia 1989 0 
26 Germany 1989 1 
27 Paraguay 1989 1 
28 Bulgaria 1989 1 
29 Gabon 1990 0 
30 Lithuania 1990 0 
31 Cote d'Ivoire 1990 0 
32 
Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts. 
1990 0 
33 Sudan 1990 0 
34 Costa Rica 1990 0 
35 Equatorial Guinea 1990 0 
36 Hungary 1990 1 
37 Romania 1990 1 
38 Czech Republic 1990 1 
39 Comoros 1990 1 
40 Nicaragua 1990 1 
41 Albania 1990 1 
42 Chile 1990 1 
43 Fiji 1990 1 
44 Poland 1990 1 
45 Burkina Faso 1991 0 
46 Switzerland 1991 0 
47 Nepal 1991 0 
48 Benin 1991 1 
49 Bangladesh 1991 1 
50 Russian Federation 1991 1 
51 Sierra Leone 1992 0 
52 Costa Rica 1992 0 
53 Papua New Guinea 1992 0 
54 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1992 0 
55 Congo, Rep. 1992 1 
56 Mali 1992 1 
57 Thailand 1992 1 
58 Slovenia 1992 1 
59 Myanmar 1993 0 
60 Mauritius 1993 0 
61 Samoa 1993 0 
62 Burundi 1993 1 
63 Madagascar 1993 1 
64 Mongolia 1993 1 
65 Bhutan 1994 0 
66 Lithuania 1994 0 
67 Azerbaijan 1994 0 
68 Panama 1994 1 
69 South Africa 1994 1 
70 Ukraine 1994 1 
71 Nepal 1996 0 
72 Ghana 1996 1 
73 Belgium 1997 0 
74 Mexico 1997 1 
75 Palau 1998 0 
76 Armenia 1998 1 
77 Kenya 1999 0 
78 Togo 1999 0 
79 Indonesia 1999 1 
80 Djibouti 1999 1 
81 Costa Rica 2000 0 
82 Belarus 2000 0 
83 Senegal 2000 1 
84 Croatia 2000 1 
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Annexe VI : Descriptive Statistics: 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LnFDI 1934     18.77712 2.862155    2.302585    26.07078 
Traitement_Matching 2310 .6562771 .4750528 0 1 
pays_en_transition 2310 .5584416 .4966804 0 1 
effet_transition 2310 .3640693 .4812724 0 1 
logPIBpc 2162 7.303887 1.273359 4.46596 11.09284 
logPopulation 2310 15.81331     1.722936    11.23131 19.28532 
ExportPIB 1968 34.64622 21.46489 .1829688 166.3635 
Educexpend 1500 21.33241 19.68218 0    94.97369 
Inflation 1990 73.41219     543.2735   -29.17266    13611.63 
QualitGovernment 1432 .4839499 .1857824 .0555556 1 
Telephonelines 2298 2717815 7302782 500 5.48e+07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
